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On May 25, 1979, when John Spenkelink became the first person in
recent times in the United States to be executed against his will, he still
maintained a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim on which
no court ever ruled.1 Three years later, when Charles Brooks became the
next person to be involuntarily executed, he too had claims that were
never fully reviewed by any court.2 Since then, many of the over forty
people executed have had claims that were either ignored or summarily
rejected by the federal courts.3
The constitutional claims not reached by the courts in these cases were
raised in successive, or second, petitions for habeas corpus. The summary
disposal of potentially valid constitutional claims raises questions about
the integrity of the system used to impose the death penalty. While capital
punishment can be attacked on a variety of moral, philosophical, and legal
grounds, it is clear that in the current political and judicial climate the
death penalty will withstand these attacks.4 Nevertheless, both opponents
and proponents of capital punishment should object to executing men and
women before their constitutional claims are adjudicated.5 The federal
1. Spinkellink [sic] v. Wainwright, No. 79-8215 (5th Cir. May 24, 1979) (order vacating stay ofexecution). Senior Circuit Judge Elbert Tuttle had, near midnight on May 22, granted a stay ofexecution based on new claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. A three-judge panel of theFifth Circuit vacated that stay, without issuing any ruling on the merits of the claim. John Spenkelink
was executed the following morning.
The court specifically stated that they would explain their actions in a formal opinion. Id. Noopinion, however, has ever been issued. See Clark, Spenkelink's Last Appeal, NATION, Oct. 27, 1979,
at 385, 403-04. The Florida courts had not previously ruled on the ineffectiveness of appellate counselclaim. See Spenkelink v. State, 372 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam); Spenkelink v. Wainwright,
372 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1979) (per curiam).
2. Brooks v. Estelle, 702 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (dismissing Brooks' appeal as moot
four months after he was executed).
3. See, e.g., Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984) (per curiam); Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921(11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); In re Shriner, 735 F.2d 1236 (1lth Cir. 1984); Smith v. Kemp, 715
F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
4. Currently, Justices Brennan and Marshall are the only members of the Court ready to strikedown capital punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The reenactment of capital sentencing provisions by over two-thirds of the states' legislatures since most previous statutes were overturned as a result of Furman v.Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), suggests that the political process is not likely to abolish
capital punishment any time soon.
5. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 955 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
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courts' new approach to successive petitions creates the risk-indeed, over
time, the certainty-that some valid claims will go unexamined. In the
context of a death sentence, this risk is unacceptable.
After reviewing the history and the current state of the law of successive
habeas corpus petitions, this Note analyzes the various types of successive
claims and the different procedural situations in which they arise. The
Note then proposes a new, two-pronged approach to successive petitions
in capital cases. The proposal would remedy the sacrifice of constitutional
justice caused by recent efforts to speed the imposition of the "ultimate
sanction."
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS
A. The Current Approach
With John Spenkelink's execution, the Supreme Court signalled a new
approach to the consideration of successive habeas corpus appeals, tradi-
tionally termed "abuse of the writ" cases. The Court's new policy, only
now becoming clear, is to deny second and third habeas petitions promptly
and summarily, without reaching or carefully considering the substantive
merits of the claims raised. Although it has never explicitly acknowledged
this new approach, the Court's actions reflect a pronounced shift to a new
rule governing successive habeas petitions.
Individual Justices of the Supreme Court have at times urged the Court
to alter its approach to successive petitions. When he was still Assistant
Attorney General, Justice Rehnquist unsuccessfully encouraged Congress
to restrict the writ of habeas corpus.
8 In 1983, Justice White wrote: "Ex-
cept in unusual circumstances, successive writs [sh]ould be summarily de-
nied."9 Justice White did, however, acknowledge that the case law of the
Court and the proceedings of Congress "implicitly recognize the legiti-
6. Id.
7. Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 906 (May 25, 1979) (denying stay of execution); 
Spenke-
link v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 901 (May 24, 1979) (same). In addition to being 
the first person
involuntarily executed since the validation of the modem death penalty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion), Spenkelink was also the first capital defendant 
in the post-
Gregg era to attempt to use a successive habeas corpus petition.
8. See Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the 
Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 94, 102 (1971). Florida Governor Bob Graham 
has also
lobbied Congress to restrict federal habeas corpus. Adler, Florida's Zealous Prosecutors: 
Death Spe-
cialists, AM. LAw., Sept. 1981, at 35, 36. Justice Rehnquist, through his opinions, and 
Governor
Graham, through his state's Attorney General's office, are thus pressing positions that 
both unsuccess-
fully advocated before Congress.
9. Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301, 1303 (White, Circuit Justice 1983) (issuing stay 
of execution
pending decision in similar case).
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macy of successive petitions raising grounds that have not previously been
presented and adjudicated." 10
Without announcing the change, the Supreme Court has in fact begun
to employ the approach contemplated by Justice White. Using brief per
curiam opinions" and summary dispositions,' 2 the Court quickly disposes
of most capital habeas petitions. It is now clear that in practice if not in
theory, the Supreme Court has adopted an implicit presumption against
reaching the merits of issues raised in successive petitions."3
This new approach, increasingly followed by the lower federal courts,' 4
will have a far-reaching impact on all areas of criminal rights 5 and will
improperly limit the ability of capital defendants to raise valid constitu-
tional claims.' This approach runs counter to the history of habeas
corpus and the intent of Congress in framing the federal habeas statutes.
10. Id.
11. E.g., Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984) (per curiam) (denying stay and certiorari);Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377 (1984) (per curiam) (vacating, less than six hours before sched-
uled execution, stay granted by circuit court); Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (per curiam)
(vacating stay granted by circuit court).
12. See, e.g., Stanley v. Kemp, 105 S. Ct. 16 (1984) (denying six claims after less than two hoursof consideration); Wainwright v. Adams, 104 S. Ct. 2183 (1984) (vacating stay granted by circuitcourt that was then considering en banc similar claim in another case); In re O'Bryan, 104 S. Ct.1674 (1984) (summary denial of relief); Autry v. McKaskle, 104 S. Ct. 1462 (1984) (denying
certiorari).
13. See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377 (1984) (per curiam) (finding "abuse of the writ" andvacating stay). "There is no affirmative evidence that the claims were deliberately withheld. But...
no explanation has been made as to why they were not raised until the very eve of the executiondate." Id. at 379 n.2 (Powell, J., joined by four other Justices, concurring). Justices White and Ste-vens attacked the Court's opinion as adopting a "per se rule" against successive petitions. Id. at 383(White & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See also Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200, 206 (1984) (percuriam) ("[AIpplicant hardly can contend that these [successive] claims were unknown to him at [the
time of the initial habeas].") (footnote omitted).
While not directly stating a new standard for successive petitions, the Supreme Court has explicitlyendorsed expediting review of such petitions; the Court at the same time subtly encouraged findings of"abuse of the writ." Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983) ("Even where it cannot be con-cluded that a [successive] petition should be dismissed [as an "abuse of the writ"], it would be proper
for the district court to expedite consideration of the petition.").
14. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3. In a noncapital case, Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159 (5thCir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit articulated a virtually per se rule against successive petitions if thepetitioner had "competent" counsel on an earlier habeas proceeeding, id. at 165, even if the counsel
only met with the petitioner once and only raised one issue in the earlier habeas, id. at 170 (Williams,
J., dissenting).
15. The writ of habeas corpus is the only practical means by which there can be federal guaran-tees of federal rights. The Supreme Court does not sit to correct all errors, even constitutional ones,and would be unable to review adequately the constitutional claims of all defendants, capital andnoncapital, on direct certiorari review from the highest court of each state. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451U.S. 949, 949-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). It thus fails to the federaldistrict courts to ensure that states honor federal rights. But see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law andFederal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1963) (arguing for deference to
state determinations of federal rights).
16. "There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful process-ing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus ... " Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286,
292 (1968).
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B. The History of Habeas Corpus and Successive Petitions
A central theme in the history of habeas corpus is the tension between
the need for finality and the desire for justice.
17 This tension, dating back
to Blackstone and early England,
I has become more visible as habeas
corpus has been used to enforce more substantive rights. In 1867, when
Congress extended the federal writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners,
1 9
the writ could redress only a handful of rights.
20 As the scope of the rights
of defendants grew,21 especially during the Warren Court years,
22 the fre-
quency of habeas petitions increased.
3 As the writs were increasingly
used to pursue the ends of justice, the focus on finality declined.
24
17. The academic debate over habeas corpus has centered not on "abuse of 
the writ" issues but on
the central question of the validity of federal habeas relitigation of claims 
that have already been
adjudicated in state court. Professor (now Judge) Pollak criticizes excessive 
concern for finality:
"[W]here personal liberty is involved, a democratic society [must insist] that 
it is less important to
reach an unshakable decision than to do justice." Pollak, Proposals to 
Curtail Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 
50, 65 (1956). Pro-
fessor Bator presents the leading opposing view. Bator, supra note 15 (habeas 
corpus should only be
used to test jurisdiction of sentencing court). See also Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970) (focus of habeas 
review should be on
innocence of petitioner, not perfection of proceedings). But see Peller, In Defense 
of Federal Habeas
Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 579 (1982) (rejecting both 
Bator's and Friendly's
approaches in favor of liberal reconsideration of all federal claims by federal 
habeas courts).
18. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 133 (6th ed. Dublin
1775).
19. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (codified 
as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982)), established, for the first time, the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts to
review the convictions and conditions of incarceration of state prisoners. Before the act's passage,
federal courts could review only the claims of federal prisoners. See, e.g., Ex 
parte Watkins, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 193, 207 (1830); In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 21-22 (E.D. Mo. 
1861) (No. 8751).
20. Originally, the writ of habeas corpus could be used to challenge only 
the jurisdiction of the
convicting court. Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830). Professor 
Bator argues that the
modern habeas statutes should be similarly construed. Bator, supra note 15, at 466. But see Peller,
supra note 17, at 610-16 (arguing that Bator misreads these early cases).
21. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel 
in all federal criminal
proceedings); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (prohibiting use of involuntary 
confessions).
22. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel 
in felony cases); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to be informed of privilege 
against self-incrimination);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1967) (right to trial by jury); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358
(1970) (requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of all elements of crime). 
For a list of rights created
or "found" during the Warren years, see Greenberg, Capital Punishment 
as a System, 91 YALE L.J.
908, 911 n.19 (1982).
The broad scope of habeas review was clear even prior to the Warren Court's 
expansion of the
rights of defendants. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), suggested 
that all constitutional claims
were cognizable under the writ of habeas corpus. The Warren Court strongly 
affirmed this view by
rejecting the limitation of habeas to questions of jurisdiction. Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963);
cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (all federal issues 
are "fair game on federal
habeas").
23. The number of annual petitions rose from 584 in 1949 to 12,088 in 1971. 
Advisory Commit-
tee Note to Rule 9 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases [hereinafter cited 
as Advisory Committee
Note].
24. Modern habeas has been used to redress constitutional errors many 
years after the original
trial. See Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (18 year delay in bringing 
habeas petition does not bar
relief); see also Lloyd v. State Div. of Parole & Probation, 557 F. Supp. 
1297 (D. Md. 1983) (over-
turning 1967 conviction in light of 1971 Supreme Court decision); Hobbs 
v. Pepersack, 206 F. Supp.
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During this expansion of habeas corpus, both Congress and the Su-
preme Court declared that access to the writ should not be unduly re-
stricted. In 1948, Congress amended the federal habeas corpus statutes to
require that a successive petition "on a factual or other ground not [al-
ready] adjudicated" should not be denied if the judge "is satisfied that the
applicant had not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the
newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ."'25 In that same year,
the Supreme Court ruled in Price v. Johnston26 that successive petitions
should be permitted "if for some justifiable reason [the defendant] was
previously unable to assert the rights or was unaware of the significance
of relevant facts." '27
Fifteen years later, in the 1963 case of Sanders v. United States,2 the
Court built on Price and articulated its clearest statement of the standard
to be applied to successive habeas corpus petitions. The Court ruled that a
federal court must reach the merits of a new claim unless the court con-
cludes that the claim was deliberately withheld or abandoned, or unless
the petitioner exhibited inexcusable neglect in failing to assert the claim
earlier.29 Under Sanders, courts can dismiss successive petitions only if a
defendant's "only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay."'3 Congress explic-
itly endorsed the Sanders guidelines in 1976.3
The Sanders standard has proved to be workable and efficient in non-
capital cases. Courts can and do summarily dismiss successive petitions
raising issues that have already been adjudicated.3 2 Yet petitioners are still
able to return to court, years after their initial convictions, and success-
fully raise new or unadjudicated challenges to their incarceration.3 The
judicial system uses successive petitions to vindicate rights and correct er-
301 (D. Md. 1962) (overturning 1947 guilty pleas because no intelligent waiver of counsel).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982). The ambiguous final phrase of the amendment about "otherwise
abus[ing] the writ" has provided the justification for limiting review of successive petitions. See infra
Part III.
26. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
27. Id. at 291.
28. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). Sanders involved 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which grants to federal prisonersrelief comparable to habeas corpus relief for state prisoners. These two post-conviction motions are
treated identically in terms of successive petitions. 373 U.S. at 12-14.
29. 373 U.S. at 18 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
30. Id.
31. In 1976, Congress approved the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-426, § 1, 90 Stat. 1334, 1334. The language of Rule 9(b) explicitly reflects the Sanders
standard. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 23.
32. See, e.g., Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238, 1248-49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.2168 (1984); United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,409 U.S. 854 (1972); United States ex rel. Schnitzler v. Follette, 406 F.2d 319, 320 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969); Cepulonis v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 381, 382-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
Whitney v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
33. See Hobbs v. Pepersack, 206 F. Supp. 301 (D. Md. 1962) (granting relief on eighth federal
habeas petition).
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rors, even where the petitioner does not learn of the rights until long after
conviction.34 In the area of capital punishment, the need for a mechanism
to correct errors at all stages of the proceedings is especially critical, be-
cause an error can mean the taking of an innocent life."
II. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CAPITAL CASES
The death sentence and the modern campaign against it have created
problems never before faced by the federal court system.
36 Capital cases,
as a class, are the first ever in which almost all defendants have sought 
to
have all legal claims fully litigated in all courts.
37 Volunteer attorneys8
and organizations 9 have attempted to pursue every legitimate claim in
every capital case. These challenges have met with unprecedented success:
almost one-half of all death sentences imposed under the modern capital
34. Arguably, long lags of time before a claim is raised burden the 
state. Evidence may be lost or
witnesses may die. The Supreme Court has already rejected this concern 
in noncapital cases, see
supra note 24; the concern carries even less weight in capital cases. Unlike 
a noncapital defendant, the
focus and attention of the state is never removed from the capital inmate; 
the state is on notice to
retain evidence and preserve important testimony in preparation for the 
inevitable capital appeals.
35. Jack Greenberg located six cases since 1972 where death-sentenced 
individuals were later
determined to be innocent. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 920 n.69. Since 
then, the Eleventh Circuit
has reversed the conviction of Jack House, in whose case the evidence 
revealed that the victims were
alive two hours after the state claimed House killed them. House v. Balkcom, 
725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.
1984). House had spent 11 years on death row pursuing his appeals.
36. The severity and finality of the death sentence calls for an especially 
high level of certainty in
the judgment. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) 
("[TIhe penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long... 
. Because of that qualita-
tive difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability 
in the determination that
death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."). The unique nature 
of the penalty requires
that all possible steps to avoid error be taken. E.g., Beck v. Alabama, 
447 U.S. 625, 642-43 (1980)
(jury must be permitted to consider lesser included offense); Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (Burger, C.J., writing for himself and three other Justices) 
(all possible mitigating factors
must be considered); accord Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 
(1932) (right to counsel in
capital case).
Rather than focusing on the greater need for accuracy and reliability 
in capital cases, this Note
analyzes the unique procedural situation of a capital defendant-if the 
completion of the sentence is
not delayed, the defendant will not be alive to pursue available remedies. 
This Note argues that apart
from any moral requirement of perfection, this procedural peculiarity 
of capital cases requires that
successive habeas petitions not be severely limited.
37. See Greenberg, supra note 22, at 910-14; see also M. MELTSNER, CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL:
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 107-10 (1973) (describing 
litigation campaign);
H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CoNsTrrtrrON AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
83 (1977). This is only a
recent phenomenon. Of the over 5,000 people executed in the one hundred 
years before Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), less than 500 sought any review in 
federal court. Green-
berg, supra note 22, at 909-10.
38. See generally Remarks by Justice Thurgood Marshall, Dedication 
Ceremony for the 1983
Volume of the Annual Survey of American Law, New York University School of Law (April 
9,
1984) (on file with author) (describing efforts of volunteer attorneys); 
The Queen of Death Row,
TIME, Dec. 31, 1979, at 60 (describing efforts to enlist attorneys for death-sentenced 
inmates).
39. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund in New York has been one of 
the most prominent organi-
zations involved in litigating against the death penalty. Others include 
the Southern Poverty Law
Center, the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee, and the Team Defense 
Project. Some state-
financed offices actively participate in the effort, including the Kentucky 
Office for Public Advocacy
and the Office of Public Defenders of the State of California.
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statutes 40 have been overturned,41 compared with the less than seven per-
cent reversal rate for non-capital convictions that are appealed. 42 Ironi-
cally, the success of the appeals has led to a general perception that the
capital appeals process is being abused and is unduly protracted. Individ-
ual Justices on the Supreme Court have expressed this view,43 and the
opinions of the Court reflect their impatience with capital appeals.44
The capital area is the only part of the criminal appeals process in
which the state, rather than the defendant, is the moving force;45 laboring
to carry out the sentence, the state creates the pressure to complete the
appeals process. 46 Some delay in the process, however, is essential in capi-
40. The "modern capital statutes" are those passed after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(per curiam), which overturned almost all of the then-existing capital punishment statutes. With
Furman and earlier cases, the campaign against the death penalty succeeded in having over 850 deathsentences vacated. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 915. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), resulted in the vacation of an additional 400 death
sentences. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 916. Since Furman, 38 states have passed new capital stat-
utes. For a list of the statutes, see W. BowERs, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN
Am?'EcA, 1864-1982, at app. B (1984).
41. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. 1 (Oct. 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited asDeath Row, U.S.A.]. In many of these cases, the entire conviction was overturned. Greenberg, supra
note 22, at 920 & nn.71-79 (citing cases).
42. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 918 nn.64-65 (citing judicial reports).
43. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Cole-man v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 957-60 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Justice Powell Assails Delay In Carrying Out Executions, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1983, atA16, col. 1
(reporting that Justice Powell proposed in speech that Congress limit capital appeals). In Coleman,
Justice Rehnquist suggested that certiorari should be promptly granted in all capital cases coming to
the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the state courts. Justice Rehnquist would have the court
review the merits of the claims raised, 451 U.S. at 956, thus foreclosing any later federal habeas
review of those issues.
This proposal would change the institutional role of the Supreme Court by making it a court to
correct every constitutional error. Given the heavy workload of the Court, the proposal would also
likely lead to an even more summary review of constitutional claims than presently takes place. Jus-
tice Rehnquist seems to assume that the Court would have time to review the hundreds of new capital
sentences imposed each year.
44. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). For a full analysis of Barefoot and the
Court's general impatience with capital appeals, see Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law:
Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the Federal Courts, 95 YALE L.J. 349 (1985).
45. Although the state also has an administrative interest in finality and the rapid completion of
the appeals process in noncapital cases, the sentences are in fact being carried out even as the habeas
appeals are being litigated. Whatever the goals of the criminal law-deterrence, retribution, rehabili-tation, protection of the community-they are not thwarted by the appeals process itself. Thus, it is
only for administrative reasons that the states should be concerned about the duration of the noncapi-
tal appeals process. Indeed, aggressively pursuing noncapital appeals might not be the most adminis-
tratively and economically efficient tactic for the state to take.
Justice Rehnquist has argued that the delay in execution required by capital appeals "not only
lessen[s] the deterrent effect of the threat of capital punishment [but also] undermin[es] the integrity of
the entire criminal justice system." Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 959 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Justice Stevens rejected this proposition, speculating that "the deterrent
value of incarceration during [the capital appeals] period of uncertainty may well be comparable to
the consequences of the ultimate step itself." Id. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certio-
rari). See also Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
57 IowA L. REv. 814, 826-31 (1972) (describing psychological pressure on death row inmates).
46. Capital defendants, on the other hand, gain little advantage from expediting the process. Sincemost capital defendants do not contest their convictions, but only their sentence, a victory on appeal
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 371, 1985
tal cases. Unlike a prison term, a death sentence can be challenged only if
it is first postponed. 47 In order to protect and enforce constitutional guar-
antees, the ultimate execution of the sentence must be delayed so that all
valid legal claims48 may be carefully presented to the courts.
Capital cases thus present a unique need for delay, a need which has
led to the misconception that death-sentenced defendants intentionally
withhold claims in order todelay the court proceedings.
49 In responding to
this perception and to the delay necessary in capital cases, the courts con-
front another unique aspect of capital cases: the gravity of the sentence
itself. Both the special need for time to consider claims, and the severity
and finality of the penalty, must be considered in crafting a rule to govern
successive habeas corpus petitions in capital cases.
III. THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE TYPES OF SUCCESSIVE
HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
In response to the lengthy habeas corpus appeals process in capital
cases, the Supreme Court has fashioned an overly broad remedy. In an
attempt to eliminate an arguably inappropriate use of successive petitions
(to raise tactically withheld claims), the Court has also struck down ap-
propriate uses of the writ. The Court should reevaluate its approach to
successive petitions, and should devise a rule that attains the desired level
of finality without sacrificing justice and fairness. To do this, the Court
usually means a life sentence. From the capital defense attorney's perspective, rushing 
an appeal is
seldom a desirable goal. The longer the delay, the more time for new information 
to be discovered and
for new legal arguments to develop. And, practically speaking, many capital attorneys 
handle more
than one case at the same time. Some attorneys, especially those with capital defense 
organizations, see
supra note 39, seldom have time to defend against each execution crisis, much 
less to hurry the
appeals of defendants not near execution.
47. Only in cases in which an individual is at liberty while appeals are pending 
is the satisfaction
of a term sentence delayed. In noncapital cases, a convicted defendant may 
begin to serve time in
prison before any appeals are heard. With a death sentence, however, a defendant 
obviously cannot
begin to serve the sentence while still processing appeals.
This distinction between death and term sentences, in terms of delay, is most clearly 
seen with long-
term sentences. Short sentences may run their course before an appeal can be successful. 
Thus, both
short-term and death-sentenced individuals must delay their sentences to-ight 
them. The irreversibil-
ity of the death sentence sets it apart, however, and demands that the sentence 
be delayed even where
a short-term sentence would not be.
48. There might be incentives to present invalid claims if no valid claim exists 
to be asserted.
Under the proposal suggested by this Note, a judge would have the power to dispose 
quickly of claims
that, on their face, clearly lack merit.
49. Justice Brennan has criticized this fear of intentional delay. "[N]o rational 
lawyer would risk
the 'sandbagging' feared by the Court." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 103 (1977) 
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting). If the lawyer does this, and "loses on this gamble, all federal review would 
be barred, and
his 'sandbagging' would have resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all judicial 
review of his client's
claims. The Court, without substantiation, apparently believes that a meaningful 
number of lawyers
[would do this]. I do not. That belief simply offends common sense." Id. at 104 n.5 
(discussing proce-
dural default rules of Sykes).
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must distinguish the different procedural postures of successive petitions,
and must analyze the different types of claims raised in the petitions.
A. Procedurally Forced Successive Petitions and an Appropriate
Response
1. The Problem
The finality of the death sentence, combined with state and federal pro-
cedural rules, sometimes forces the use of successive habeas corpus peti-
tions. In some capital cases, a peculiar situation arises in which the state
courts refuse to stay an execution date and the defendant is forced to re-
quest a stay from the federal courts by filing a petition for habeas corpus,
even if federal procedural rules prevent the defendant from bringing all
valid claims into federal court in the first habeas petition. In this situation,
the defendant is faced with the choice of not requesting a stay (and thus
being executed) or requesting a stay based on some, but not all, of the
claims raised in state court (and thus having either to forgo the remaining
claims or to raise them in a successive petition).
The interaction between state and federal courts creates these situations
in which certain issues become ripe for federal review before others. The
doctrine of exhaustion50 requires that all claims presented in a federal
habeas petition be first presented, and ruled upon, in the state courts. If
the state courts do not complete review of all claims simultaneously, a
defendant is left with some issues ready for federal review while other
claims remain bottled up in the state courts.5"
50. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), habeas corpus relief "shall not be granted unless it appears thatthe applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State .... " See also 28U.S.C. § 2254(c) (no exhaustion until applicant has no possible state procedure in which to raise
claim).
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), held that a district court should dismiss without prejudice"mixed petitions," which contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims. This ruling stemmed fromholdings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 513 n.5 (citing Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348(5th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1976)). Those two circuits,
however, stated that in the case of a mixed petition, the inmate would be permitted to bring a secondpetition raising the previously unexhausted issues. Galtieri, 582 F.2d at 355, 358-59, Gonzales, 546F.2d at 810. Four members of the Rose Court, however, rejected that view. 455 U.S. at 521
(O'Connor, J., writing for herself and three other Justices) ("a prisoner who decides to proceed withhis exhausted claims and deliberately sets aside his unexhausted claims risks dismissal of subsequent
federal petitions").
51. A hypothetical illustrates this timing problem: A trial court convicts a defendant and sentences
him to death. The court-appointed attorney handles the direct appeal to the state supreme court,raising Issue "A." The state supreme court denies relief. The court-appointed attorney then ceases towork on the case. (An indigent defendant has a constitutional right to counsel only at trial and in anappeal of right. Compare Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to counsel for discretionaryreview) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in criminal trial) and
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel for appeal of right in criminal case).) Avolunteer attorney, experienced in capital cases, begins work on post-conviction appeals, and discovers
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When this occurs in states like Florida, which does not commonly grant
stays of execution during post-conviction proceedings,
2 the defendant may
be forced to rely on a successive petition.
53 Once the state courts have
completed their review on direct appeal from the conviction, the stay of
execution issued by the state court expires, even though state post-
conviction appeals may still be pending. The defendant then has no choice
but to go to federal court for a stay, whether or not all possible claims are
ripe for federal review. When later claims become ready for review, the
defendant must resort to a successive petition or forgo raising the claims in
federal court."
Under the federal courts' new approach to successive petitions, those
issues still before state courts at the time of the initial federal habeas peti-
tion are later treated summarily. Any non-capital defendant has the op-
a new claim, Issue "B." Under the state rules, Issue "A" cannot be brought 
in a post-conviction
appeal because the high court has already ruled against the claim. Due to the 
requirement of exhaus-
tion, however, the defendant must bring Issue "B" in a state post-conviction proceeding 
before he
presents the issue to the federal court. If, as happens in some states, stays 
of execution are seldom
issued during the state post-conviction appeals, the defendant is forced to raise 
Issue "A" in federal
court to forestall an execution, even though the defendant cannot yet bring Issue 
"B" to the federal
court. The defendant must therefore resort to a successive habeas petition or lose 
the opportunity to
raise Issue "B" in federal court. Under the federal courts' new approach to 
successive petitions, espe-
cially as articulated in Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 1983), any 
issues raised on
successive petition in this situation would be summarily dismissed.
52. In the over 100 cases in which death warrants have been signed in Florida, 
the Florida courts
have stayed less than 20 executions. In the other cases, the defendants have 
been forced to request
stays from the federal courts. This problem, also present in Texas, arises at least 
in part because state
post-conviction proceedings in Florida are held in the sentencing court, usually 
in front of the sentenc-
ing judge. (This procedure differs from that in Georgia, for instance, where 
the court in the county of
incarceration hears the state habeas petition.) Thus, in Florida, the defendant 
must ask the original
trial judge to stay her own judgment and to find the original proceedings 
faulty. According to one
Florida attorney who handles death cases, stays are generally awarded by the 
state courts only when
the original judge has died and a new judge reviews the case. Telephone interview with Richard Burr,
Office of the Public Defender, West Palm Beach, Fla. (May 13, 1985).
53. The problem is most serious for inmates who are unable to obtain appellate 
counsel early in
the appeals process. When the state sets-an execution date, the inmate must 
hurriedly find an attor-
ney, who then has only a matter of days to obtain a stay of execution. If the state 
court does not issue
a stay, the attorney must go to federal court without having had time to research 
the entire case, much
less to litigate all possible issues in state court. See Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200, 
205-06 nn.3-4
(1984) (per curiam) (denying stay even though Antone's trial counsel dropped 
Antone's case days
before his scheduled execution and replacement counsel omitted critical 
issues from initial habeas
petition); cf. Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 492 n.2 (Phillips, Circuit Judge 1980) 
("It is completely
unrealistic to suppose a practical ability to exhaust normal avenues of post-conviction 
review provided
by both state and federal law within [a four-week] time frame, even were 
every step to be taken
within the shortest conceivable time by both litigants and courts.").
54. This situation requires the petitioner to forgo one constitutional right 
to assert another. The
Supreme Court has frequently rejected this choice. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 
406 U.S. 605
(1972) (rule requiring defendant to testify first or not at all deprived defendant 
of right to counsel and
infringed on right to remain silent); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 
(1968) (impermissible to
force choice between remaining silent and retaining job as policeman).
This situation is even more extreme than the case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
438-40 (1963),
which declared that waivers made to lessen the risk of capital punishment are 
not sufficiently volun-
tary to require a federal habeas court to abstain from review. Here, the 
petitioner involuntarily loses
constitutional claims in order to avoid an imminent execution.
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tion to wait until crucial second claims catch up before entering federal
court.5" The capital defendant, however, cannot afford to wait; he is
forced into federal court early to avoid execution.
2. A Proposed Response
These cases are not true successive claims. Rather, the defendant is dili-
gently attempting to bring all valid claims through the state court system
and into the federal system within the same general time frame. Prior to
the initial federal proceedings, the potentially successive claims have al-
ready been raised, but not adjudicated, in state court. If federal courts
summarily reject successive petitions on these later claims, they are al-
lowing state procedural rules to deny the vindication of federal constitu-
tional rights in federal courts. Whether or not this bottling up is a willful
attempt to thwart federal review, an individual state's procedure should
not be able to restrict the right to federal habeas corpus.
A better approach to the problem of procedurally forced successive peti-
tions would be for federal district courts to issue a stay of execution on the
initial petition for habeas relief, but to hold the case in abeyance until all
issues are exhausted in state courts and therefore ready for federal review.
Although only a few lower federal courts have ever held a petition in
abeyance (and then only in specifically limited circumstances),5" the Su-
preme Court itself in Sanders encouraged "imaginative handling of a
prisoner's first motion" in order to "anticipate and avoid the problem of a
hearing on a second or successive motion."' 57
55. Not all noncapital defendants will wait in these situations. Some might decide that the issue(s)
ready for federal review are so strong that there is no need to wait until others catch up. This,
however, is a tactical judgment; no pressure to avoid execution forces it.
56. In Arango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit ordered the
district court to hold a petition in abeyance; in denying the state's petition for rehearing, however, the
court emphasized that a state court stay of execution was already in effect. 739 F.2d 529 (11th Cir.
1984). The court did not seem willing to adopt the proposal presented here: to hold a petition in
abeyance (and issue a federal stay), whether or not a state court stay remained in effect.
In Shaw v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487 (Phillips, Circuit Judge 1980), Judge Phillips granted a stay
where the petitioner had appeals pending in three courts: a petition for rehearing of denial of certio-
rari in the U.S. Supreme Court, an appeal in the court of appeals from the denial by the district court
of an initial federal habeas petition, and a state post-conviction proceeding. The order instructed the
district court to wait until the state post-conviction appeals were adjudicated, allowing the issues
raised in them to be presented in federal court. Id. at 493. Judge Phillips offered "to dissolve this stay
order if. . .the Supreme Court of South Carolina should resolve itself to stay the execution pending
exhaustion of [state] post-conviction review procedures." Id. Eighteen months later, the Fourth Circuit
granted a writ of mandamus directing the district court not to entertain an application for vacation of
the earlier stay. In re Shaw, No. 81-1396 (4th Cir. May 15, 1981). The Fourth Circuit reviewed the
merits of the claims only after all of the petitioner's issues were consolidated in one habeas appeal. See
Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1984).
57. 373 U.S. 1, 22 (1963). In Sanders, which involved a prisoner's pro se habeas petition, the
Court suggested that the lower court could have attempted to locate and rule on any valid claim the
prisoner could bring. This logic suggests that a federal court should hold an initial habeas petition in
abeyance when the prisoner has already brought other claims into state court.
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This approach will allow for a careful review of all of the issues
presented, without forcing defendants to waive or default on the claims
that are slow to emerge from state courts. The enforcement of federal
rights will thus not depend on the procedures and calendars of state
courts.58
B. True Successive Petitions and the Appropriate Standard of Review
In true successive petition situations, and even in some cases where an
initial petition is held in abeyance,5
9 the federal courts will be forced to
evaluate the justifications for delayed habeas petitions. To create a more
just approach to successive petitions, it is necessary to analyze each of the
situations in which such petitions arise. There are seven general categories
of claims raised in successive petitions.
6" These categories, reviewed be-
low, raise different considerations in terms of fairness and delay, and
should not be grouped together under one rule against successive petitions.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), which requires courts to dismiss without prejudice "mixed
petitions" that include unexhausted claims, does not prohibit a district court from holding a habeas
petition in abeyance. As the exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional constraint, see Sharpe 
v.
Buchanan, 317 U.S. 238 (1942), Rose requires only that relief not be granted on mixed petitions
(until they are no longer mixed). Rose intended to avoid the judicial inefficiency of piecemeal litiga-
tion. 455 U.S. at 520. The hold-in-abeyance proposal is the most efficient option, avoiding both piece-
meal litigation and successive petitions. By allowing district courts to avoid the hearing on the "abuse
of the writ" question, see Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948), the hold-in-abeyance, proposal
would enable the courts to review most capital cases in one and only one hearing.
58. The federal courts' general deference to state procedural requirements is a matter of judicial
discretion based on federalism principles. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84, 88 (1977). A court
can and should put this deference aside when justice requires. In the case of a successive habeas
petition, a court should not hesitate to issue a stay when the state courts refuse to do so; the stay does
not short-circuit any state court proceeding.
The idea of a federal court stepping in when a state court does not act is not new. At least one
lower court has decided that it should provide, in the context of a federal habeas proceeding, the post-
conviction procedure that the state court should have provided. Grigsby v. Mabry, 637 F.2d 525,
528-29 (8th Cir. 1980) (no "special circumstances" indicated that state court was more appropriate
forum). Other courts have given states the choice of providing the required procedure or releasing the
defendant. See, e.g., Hart v. Eyman, 458 F.2d 334, 339-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 916
(1972); Buchanan v. United States ex rel Reis, 379 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
59. The hold-in-abeyance proposal does not eliminate all potential for abuse. A federal court, for
instance, might hold a petition raising Issue "A" in abeyance, waiting for Issue "B" to be adjudicated
in state court. If, when Issue "B" is almost ripe for federal review, the petition raises Issue "C" in
state court, the federal court must decide whether to continue holding the petition in abeyance or to
proceed to consider the first two issues. In either case, the court must evaluate the reasons for the
delay.
60. The categorizations used here necessarily raise the question of which party has the burden to
show that a claim is in a given category. At the outset, the state has the burden to plead an abuse of
the writ. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 10-11; Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. at 292. After the
state has alleged an abuse of the writ, Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases and the Model
Form for Use in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases Involving a Rule 9 Issue require the habeas petitioner to
establish, in a successive petition, why there is no abuse. Because the habeas proceeding is essentially
"civil" in nature, see Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978), the burden
of proof is "the usual 'preponderance of the evidence' standard," Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 551
(1981).
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1. Types of Successive Claims
a. Frivolous Claims
The type of claim raised in successive petitions that is perhaps the easi-
est to deal with is the clearly frivolous claim."1 A claim is frivolous if on
its face it has no legal merit, even if the alleged facts on which the claim is
based are assumed to be true. Under any plausible approach, including
the Sanders formula and the federal courts' new approach to successive
petitions, such claims should be summarily denied.62
b. Relitigated Claims
As with frivolous claims, claims already litigated in federal court should
be summarily dismissed.63 Although res judicata does not apply to habeas
corpus petitions,64 the federal courts should not be required to give a full
evidentiary hearing to claims that have been carefully reviewed and adju-
dicated in an earlier federal habeas proceeding. Assuming that the claim is
truly the same as one previously litigated (i.e., no new facts or law bear
on the claim), the claim need be reviewed only in exceptional circum-
stances, such as when a judge made a clearly erroneous ruling on the first
habeas petition or when the attorney on the initial claim was ineffective. 15
61. Many claims ultimately deemed frivolous are likely to arise in pro se petitions.
62. In deciding whether a habeas petition is frivolous, the court should assume the facts presented
to be true, an approach similar to that taken with motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim made
under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If, assuming the facts, no relief is warranted, the petition should be
quickly dismissed. But if the facts might lead to relief, the claim falls into one of the other categories
in this Section.
63. The term "relitigated claims" refers to claims that have already been litigated in the federal
system. This Note adopts the widely held assumption that federal courts may reconsider federal claims
on which state courts have already ruled. Thus, this Note does not use the term "relitigate" in the
same manner as the articles which challenge or defend that assumption. See, e.g., Bator, supra note
15; Peller, supra note 17.
Further, a claim is not considered to have been litigated in federal court if the only federal action
taken on it has been a Supreme Court denial of certiorari to the highest court of the state. Federal
courts have frequently granted relief on federal claims that the Supreme Court chose not to reach on
appeal from the state court. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (noting earlier denial
of certiorari); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 n.1 (1966) (same).
64. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 8 ("Conventional notions of finality of litigation
have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged ...
The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas . . . is inherent in the very role and function of the
writ."). But see Kelley, Finality and Habeas Corpus: Is the Rule that ResJudicata May Not Apply
to Habeas Corpus or Motion to Vacate Still Viable?, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1975). Kelley argues that
res judicata should apply to habeas, but then proceeds to recognize enough exceptions so as to exclude
only overlooked, abandoned, and tactically withheld claims. Id. at 53 n.290.
65. These exceptions might better be viewed as new claims arising not out of the original arrest,
trial, or sentencing, but out of the first habeas proceeding itself. There must, of course, be a limit on
how many times a defendant can claim ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. At a minimum,
however, capital defendants should not be penalized for the inexperience or lack of resources of coun-
sel hurriedly retained in the face of an impending execution. Contra Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S. 200,
205-06 (1984) (per curiam) (denying stay of execution).
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The Sanders decision, while permitting judges to deny relitigated
claims quickly, does not categorically reject all such claims. Rather, it en-
tertains the possibility that a claim can be relitigated "[e]ven if the same
ground was rejected on the merits on a prior application," but places the
burden on the applicant "to show that the ends of justice would be served
by permitting the redetermination of the ground."6'
The Supreme Court's new summary approach to successive petitions
does not appear to include an "ends of justice" test for relitigated claims.
61
Arguably, with claims of this type, concern for finality will almost always
outweigh concern for justice; unless the initial proceeding was somehow
flawed, questions of justice should have been resolved with the first habeas
petition. In the area of capital punishment, however, the "ends of justice"
possibility for reconsideration of a claim is an important safeguard against
mistake in the imposition of a death sentence.
c. "New Law" Claims
Claims based on "new law," if the new law has been deemed to apply
retroactively, clearly should be reviewed on the merits even if raised in a
second habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court's new approach, how-
ever, steps back from the Sanders formula and puts "new law" claims in
jeopardy of summary dismissal.
"New law" claims are usually made after the Supreme Court finds a
new constitutional right or strengthens an old one.
6" With almost all ex-
pansions of the rights of criminal defendants, the Supreme Court must
decide whether the change retroactively reaches defendants already ar-
rested or convicted at the time of the change. Frequently, however, the
Court delays deciding the issue of retroactivity until it is squarely
presented."9
66. 373 U.S. at 16.
67. In a related area of habeas corpus law, the Wainwright v. Sykes procedural default test in-
cludes a proviso that the federal courts should reach an otherwise barred claim if the defendant will
"in the absence of such an adjudication. . . be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 433 U.S. 72, 91
(1977).
68. Cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony cases),
and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to be informed of privilege against self-
incrimination), are examples of opinions making "new law." "New law," however, can emanate from
places other than the Supreme Court. State courts can create new state law by interpreting their state
constitutions; this type of "new law" claim is most appropriately raised in state court. See, e.g., Rose
v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19 (1975).
Congress can also create new law by altering some statutory aspect of the criminal justice system.
Statutory claims are cognizable in federal habeas proceedings in certain situations. See, e.g., Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344-46 (1974). An example of a statute that gives state inmates a federal
cause of action is Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2520 (1982) (limiting wiretapping by law enforcement agencies).
69. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) (refusing to give retroactive effect
to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which extended Fourth Amendment rights); Johnson
Vol. 95: 371, 1985
The Rush to Execution
If a newly announced constitutional right is given only prospective ef-
fect, then successive petitions attempting to claim the right retroactively
should be summarily dismissed. If, however, the "new law" is retroactive,
a defendant should be able to take advantage of it, even if he filed his
initial habeas petition prior to the change in the law. Similarly, if the
Court has reserved its decision on retroactivity, a defendant deserves an
opportunity to litigate that question.70 To deny retroactive "new law"
claims in successive petitions creates the irrational situation of having ret-
roactivity depend on whether a defendant has alreaidy filed a first habeas
corpus petition at the time of the change in the law.71 This, however, is
exactly the possibility created by the federal courts' new approach to suc-
cessive petitions.
d. "New Fact" Claims
Just as courts should fully review successive petitions based on "new
law," they should also fully review successive petitions based on "new
facts." The category of "new facts" includes any evidence discovered after
the initial trial that might either affect the outcome of a new trial or indi-
cate that the defendant's constitutional rights were violated in the earlier
proceeding. Because "[t]he primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding
is to make certain that a man is not unjustly imprisoned, '72 claims based
on newly discovered evidence, such as a confession by another individual
or proof of prosecutorial misconduct, are among the situations most ap-
propriate for habeas corpus relief. No defendant, capital or otherwise,
should be barred from presenting new evidence that casts doubt on the
validity of a conviction.
In addition, capital cases present a far more subtle type of "new" evi-
dence: evidence which should have been introduced in mitigation during
the sentencing phase of a capital trial.7 ' Because any favorable evidence
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 732 (1966) (giving only partial retroactive effect to Miranda).
70. Cf, e.g., Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301 (White, Circuit Justice 1983) (staying execution
pending final disposition of case with related issue).
71. A defendant who raised an issue prior to a favorable change in the law would be penalized
relative to a defendant who raised the issue later. Such a rule would create an incentive to delay filing
initial habeas corpus petitions-exactly the opposite of the incentive currently desired by the Supreme
Court. Federal guarantees of constitutional rights should not depend on when a defendant, relative to
others, raises the claim. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963) ("[S]urely no just and humane
legal system can tolerate a result whereby a Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their
confessions were found to have been coerced yet a Noia, whose confession was also coerced, remains in
jail for life [because he delayed raising the claim].").
72. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948).
73. In the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), most new capital
statutes have established a bifurcated proceeding in which guilt or innocence is decided in a separate
stage from the sentencing decision. At the sentencing phase, any mitigating evidence can be introduced
to discourage the finding or recommendation of a death sentence.
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can be presented in the sentencing hearing in mitigation of the offense,
and because many of the attorneys who handle capital cases at the trial
and initial appellate levels are inexperienced in death penalty proceed-
ingsJ expert appellate attorneys in capital cases can and frequently do
find evidence that should have been introduced to dissuade the jury from
imposing death.7
This type of evidence, uncovered long after the trial, raises serious
questions about the level of diligence due a capital defendant by trial
counsel. In light of the severity of the sentence, capital defendants should
not be penalized for a lack of awareness or willingness on the part of trial
counsel to investigate the defendant's case fully.
7 8
Thus, whether the "new facts" concern the validity of either the convic-
tion or the sentence, the defendant should be allowed to raise the new
claims in a successive habeas corpus petition.77 This opportunity is fore-
closed if successive petitions continue to be summarily dismissed.
e. Overlooked and Unresearched Claims
For a variety of reasons-lack of experience, time, or money-some
capital defendants' initial appellate counsel overlook or are unable to re-
search all valid constitutional claims arising from the capital trial.
7 8 When
the failure to present claims in an initial petition does not stem from a
tactical decision to withhold claims, but from limited resources, the failure
is not the type of intentional abuse of the habeas process that a policy
regarding successive petitions should attempt to prevent. In a system that
seldom provides funds for appellate counsel79 and in which the courts ex-
74. Court-appointed attorneys, especially in smaller towns, seldom have any experience in defend-
ing a capital case. The additional procedure in a capital trial requires insight and effort beyond that
needed in most noncapital cases.
75. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 1, at 402 (evidence of family tragedy not introduced in penalty
phase of trial).
76. If this "new" evidence was in fact known to trial counsel and intentionally withheld, equally
serious ineffectiveness problems arise. It might be argued that upholding ineffectiveness claims in this
situation would encourage attorneys to be intentionally ineffective in order to preserve that issue for
appeal. Yet, especially in light of the near impossibility of establishing a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel on appeal, it is almost inconceivable that an attorney would withhold evidence that might
prevent the imposition of the death penalty at the initial trial.
Only in a situation where the verdict of death is virtually a foregone conclusion, see, e.g., Coleman
v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 953 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (jurors admitted influence of pretrial
publicity), can one imagine that an attorney would intentionally be ineffective. In such cases, however,
the very fact that the verdict is foregone raises doubts about the validity of the verdict.
77. Under the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable in habeas corpus cases, see
supra note 60, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing a "new fact." At the outset of the
successive petition proceeding, however, the district court should assume the new facts to be true in
determining whether or not there is a potentially valid "new fact" claim presented.
78. See Clark, supra note 1, at 401; Rising Death Row Population Burdens Volunteer Lawyers,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1982, at A15, col. 5.
79. Most states provide appointed counsel only as far as constitutionally required (the appeal of
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pedite capital appeals,"' a capital defendant should not be responsible for
the failure of counsel to raise an issue due to lack of resources or time.81
By focusing on the "deliberate[ness]" of the withholding of claims and
the intention to "vex, harass, or delay," 2 the Sanders formula permits a
judge to reach claims appellate counsel failed to raise at an earlier stage
because of ineptness, poverty, or an impending execution date. By viewing
overlooked claims as tactically withheld, and thus summarily denying suc-
cessive petitions with little or no consideration of the merits of the claims,
the Supreme Court is foreclosing this option.
f. Abandoned Claims
Claims that were raised in early state proceedings but were not later
presented in an initial federal habeas corpus petition can actually be clas-
sified in one of the other categories presented in this Section. If the aban-
donment of a claim was a strategic decision made by counsel, it falls into
the category of tactically withheld claims. If, however, the decision to
abandon the claim was not motivated by an attempt to gain advantage, the
claim comes under the overlooked or unresearched claim category; either
the attorney simply incompetently overlooked the claim, or the attorney
did not pursue it for more practical, perhaps financial, reasons. In either
case, the claims should be treated as overlooked or unresearched claims;
an appropriate standard for successive petitions should not prevent consid-
eration of these claims on their merits.
g. Tactically Withheld Claims
The most troubling category consists of claims that the initial appellate
attorney tactically withheld, either intending to raise them in a later pro-
ceeding or deciding that the client would be better off if they were not
raised at all. These withheld claims, viewed as an attempt to manipulate
right to the state's highest court). See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (states not compelled to
provide counsel to indigents seeking discretionary Supreme Court review of convictions). A few states
do provide some assistance in post-conviction proceedings. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 912 n.24
(citing the Office for Public Advocacy in Frankfort, Kentucky, and the California Office of Public
Defenders). Only California explicitly allows for appointment of counsel to prepare Supreme Court
certiorari petitions. See In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 633, 447 P.2d 117, 131, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 35
(1968), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 971 (1972).
80. See generally Note, supra note 44 (describing acceleration of appeals process).
81. The Constitution requires, at the very least, that the defendant have counsel consider and be
able to afford to research all possible claims. Most courts view the question of which issues'to raise on
appeal as a decision to be made by counsel (unlike, for instance, the decision to plead guilty). See
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (no constitutional right to have appellate counsel raise every
non-frivolous issue that criminal defendant requests).
82. 373 U.S. at 18.
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the judiciary and abuse the writ of habeas corpus, most concern the
courts.8 3
But it is in this category of successive claims that the greatest injustice is
done to some defendants. Many capital defendants, some sentenced over
ten years ago, filed their first federal habeas petition years before the Su-
preme Court altered its approach to successive petitions. Although few, if
any, cases have been documented, some attorneys may have decided that
"abusing" the system was in the best interest of their clients, and thus
may have decided to withhold claims. Because the courts were at that time
lenient toward successive petitions, a decision to withhold claims may have
then been a sound tactical judgment."'
Now these defendants find that the rules have changed. When, years
after initial filing, their first habeas petitions fail, their other valid claims
cannot be brought into court. The irony of this situation is revealed when
viewed alongside the "new law" claims discussed above.
85 The restrictive
approach of the Supreme Court toward successive petitions limits the abil-
ity of defendants to take advantage of "new [positive] law," yet at the
same time imposes "new [negative] law" in the form of these very restric-
tions on successive habeas corpus petitions. A just rule, such as the Sand-
ers "ends of justice" approach, would not allow so unfair a result.
2. The Sanders Formula Revitalized
This analysis of the various types of claims commonly raised in succes-
sive habeas corpus petitions leads to the conclusion that the new approach
83. There are at least three situations in which an attorney might knowingly withhold a poten-
tially valid claim from an initial habeas corpus petition, but want to raise it later.
First, the attorney decides that the claims actually presented are so meritorious that there is no need
to present other potential issues. If the attorney is correct that the presented claims are winning
claims, then there is no successive petition problem. If, however, the attorney is wrong, serious ques-
tions about the effectiveness of the assistance of appellate counsel arise.
Second, the attorney is aware of the claim but does not have the time and/or resources to pursue
the claim. See supra note 78. No matter how competent by traditional standards the attorney may be,
this situation also raises the question of effectiveness of counsel.
Third, the attorney decides that there is a tactical advantage in withholding the claim. While this is
the hardest case, this Note suggests that even this attorney may be constitutionally ineffective.
There are no common sanctions, such as bar disciplinary proceedings, against an attorney for inten-
tionally withholding claims from a habeas petition. Thus, the primary deterrent to the attorney is the
harm to the client that will likely follow from a lost, valid claim. In the context of a capital case, that
harm is devastating, and likely to be a serious deterrent to the withholding of claims.
At least one leading capital defense organization strongly discourages withheld claims: "Each
[habeas] petition . . . must be litigated by counsel as if there will be no second chance to raise an
issue, to develop the facts more fully, or to explore the legal arguments more thoroughly or cre-
atively." J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Manual for Capital Cases 16 (NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, Tent. Draft 1983) (on file with author).
84. In the past, the Sanders formula has not been rigorously applied. Now that the Supreme
Court has indicated its seriousness about restricting successive petitions, no rational lawyer could
think this a sound approach. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 103 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
The Rush to Execution
adopted by the federal courts must be reevaluated and the Sanders rule
revitalized. A fair successive petition rule should permit "new law," "new
fact," overlooked, and unresearched claims.8" On the other hand, it should
limit frivolous, relitigated, and tactically withheld claims. In limiting these
claims, however, the rule cannot be so strict as to prevent the considera-
tion of claims in the interest of justice, even if the claims were intention-
ally withheld or have been previously adjudicated.
Just such a rule is embodied in the Sanders formula. Although the case
has never been overruled, its guidelines have fallen into disuse. Those
guidelines are in keeping with the historical, statutory, and legal spirit of
habeas corpus, which should be widely available to enforce constitutional
guarantees.
The Sanders formula will permit courts to control delay without inhib-
iting justice. The need to ensure that valid claims are addressed and that
justice is not limited is strong in all criminal cases; it is strongest in capital
cases. If the states choose to impose the "ultimate sanction," the Constitu-
tion requires that it be imposed with care and certainty. The federal
courts should not rush this determination.
86. A case currently awaiting decision from the Eleventh Circuit sitting en bane directly confronts
the successive petition problem in a situation where the claims have strong merit and the explanations
for delay are legitimate. Moore v. Zant, 734 F.2d 585 (denying relief), vacated for rehearing en
bane, id. at 604 (11th Cir. 1984). Moore raised a variety of claims in his successive petition: 1) an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, which his first appellate counsel refused to raise because
he was too busy, which Moore tried to raise pro se directly to the initial habeas court, and which the
initial habeas cburt refused to hear; 2) a "new law" claim concerning the right to remain silent in
interviews to be used in a capital sentencing hearing, based on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981),
decided months after the denial of Moore's inital habeas; 3) a "new law" claim concerning the right
to cross-examine hearsay witnesses whose statements appear in the state's presentence report, based
on Proffit v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 1982), modified, 706 F.2d 311 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983), decided years after the denial of Moore's initial habeas; and 4)
"new fact" claims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing based on studies not concluded until
after the denial of the initial habeas. En Banc Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 9-11, Moore v. Zant,
No. 84-8423 (11th Cir. argued Sept. 11, 1984). Despite these and other claims (including a claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), the strength of which the district court acknowledged, the
district court denied the successive petition as an abuse of the writ. A three-judge panel of the Elev-
enth Circuit later adopted and reprinted the unpublished district court order. Moore v. Zant, 734
F.2d at 587 (1984). In dissenting from the panel opinion, Judge Kravitch wrote:
Unquestionably, genuine abuses of the writ must be prevented, but we must not adopt mea-
sures so broad that legitimate claims will not be heard. I fear that the majority's approach
today loses sight of the fact that the [abuse of the writ] doctrine "is not intended to automati-
cally foreclose each petitioner who fails to claim every ground for relief in his first application
in federal court."
Id. at 604 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (quoting Haley v. Estelle, 632 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980)).
